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A Cat’s Lick: Democratization and Minority Communities in the Post-Soviet Baltic by Timofei Agarin, 2010, 
Amsterdam, N.Y: Rodopi.
Timofei Agarin’s book is an in-depth study of relations between ethnic groups in the Baltics.
The author has written a comparative case study of the three states, covering a vast array of 
questions and issues of interethnic relations, such as the historical legacy of the Baltics, state-building 
and framing non-titulars, minority cooptation and representation in political as well as social 
structures, educational and language policies. This is the ﬁ rst book that makes an attempt to compare 
ethnic minority communities in all three states.
Besides the famous Baltic political scientists (A.Lieuven, R.Taagepera, A.Krupjavicius, others ), the 
author refers to the works of many prominent social scientists: J. Linz, A.Stepan, L.Diamond, R.Dahl, 
D.Galbreath, S.Smootha, A.Przeworski, G.O`Donnell. The book is organized into nine chapters. The 
ﬁ nal two chapters tackle the complex issues of minority representation and their engagement in 
civic initiatives. One of the virtues of the book is its elaborate analysis of the various dimensions 
of interethnic relations. Agarin handles the massive literature and data exististing about interetnic 
relations in the Baltic. A Cat’s Lick is written in an emotional style, at the same time maintaining a 
discoursive style of analysis. The book is convincingly argued, logically structured and organized, 
methodologically sophisticated and extremely well-informed. He demonstrates deep and detailed 
knowledge of not only minority issues but also transitional theory. Agarin combines his ambitious 
intellectual agenda to reach the broad audience of titular versus non-titular nations and diverse social 
layers. His analysis is certainly an important contribution to the discourse of transition theory within 
the contect of democratisation.
In reﬂ ecting the legacies of the authoritarian past, Agarin’s book addresses the role that non-
titular nations have played in the process of liberalisation and democratisation, the relations between 
states and societies. Basically, the discussion proceeds along three lines: First, the book examines the 
issues of state-building and nation-building and their impact on democratization. The author indicated 
that the state and nation-buiding in these three countries has largely overlapped, being envisaged 
by majority populations without consultations with the local ethnic majorities (p.127). Second, it 
compares the impact of ethno-cultural diversity on the development of the Baltic nation-states.Third, 
the book addresses the questions of the participation of minority communities in the development, 
criticism and improvements of state institutions and policies since independence. Agarin’s analysis 
points out that two decades after independence the post-communist states and societies are seen by 
many members of majority groups as serving primarily the interests of their ethnic community. In 
this situation, the members of non-titular communities need to adopt to the majority’s perceptions 
in order to beneﬁ t from the achivements of democratisation. Agarin’s discussion makes it clear that 
the structures of political communities were designed to suit the interests of titular nations and, 
therefore, resulted in the marginalisation of the minority communities. (see also Agarin 2010: 380)
However, the book ‘suﬀ ers’ from evident ﬂ aws that the author tends to repeat – pieces are 
sometimes overlapping, the style is emotional, and the theoretical conceptions are superﬁ cially 
argued. Methodologically the book is rather blurred. It aims to cover very many societal aspects, 
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however, this results in a relatively superﬁ cial analysis of the issues. The author mainly uses qualitative 
discoursive historical analysis, not paying much attention to the quantitative side. The descriptive 
discourse analysis frequently contains a simple sequence of facts, which undoubtedly undermines the 
quality of the book. Agarin’s deductive approach suggests that most suitable facts are picked up just to 
ﬁ t to one or another discoursive framework. Many prominent social scientists, who speciﬁ cally focus 
on interethnic issues (J. Rex, J. Berry and others ), and their conceptions are not examined in the book.
 The presented research ﬁ ts into the regional study, although the author makes some comparisons 
and draws parallels with other European states. The research has highlighted some of the controversial 
social and political developments after collapse of communism. Agarin raises the fundamental critical 
question of whether a democracy based on liberal rights can really deal with the complexities of real 
life. As the author puts it, “critical research needs to clarify the reasons why the post-Soviet Baltic 
states are considered to be democratic despite omnipresent deﬁ ciencies” (p.6).
Certainly, the Baltic countries are on the boundary between two civilizations – the East and the 
West. Analytically and taxonomically it is relatively easy to convince the reader that the three states 
are facing democratic deﬁ ciencies while these countries do not belong to the ﬁ rst world or among 
established democracies yet. It would probably be naive to think that the the legacy of a totalitarian 
past has vanished in just twenty years after regaining independence. Many people have been socialised 
most of their life in communist times, when the wish for a ‘strong hand’, the hegemony of one nation, 
hierachy and rigid subordination was (and partly still is) rooted in their mindsets. Agarin cursorily 
admits these points on p.326.
However, democracy and democratisation in a broader sense are on-going processes in many 
states, and regardless of their liberal nature, one should be very much afraid when they stop. 
Understandably, in transitional theory the author did not use the concept of consolidated democracy 
as long as the latter is viable when democracy is the ‘only game in the town’.
Agarin is certainly right; indeed, international conditionality inﬂ uences the general attitutes of 
the elites towards minority integration. The Baltic states have been members of the EU and NATO 
for already seven years. However, most of the critiscism comes from the Russian side. The critics 
from international organisations, such as the OSCE and others, have been relatively modest and have 
mainly touched upon the educational and language policy. In other words, the Baltic states comply 
with the ethnic minority norms of the international community.
 Agarin is right when he sees the great democratic potential of minorities for the advancement 
of democracy. I agree that the titulars have by far not used the non-titulars’ social capital and, in 
this respect, substantial improvement can be made. In order to use this potential, both majority and 
minority groups should be in a dialogue and make compromises.
The book argues that the design of political institutions is crucial for successful democratisation. 
However, besides institutional structures and their maturity, there seem to be other factors that aﬀ ect 
the success of democratisation: political culture, the necessity to have liberal orientations widely 
spread among people, individuals’ perceptions and stereotypes, mentalities. 
One of democracy’s deﬁ ning characteristics is that ethnic minorities as any other social category do 
not constitute a monolithic, ideologically united group, but instead are plural and partly autonomous 
from each other with diﬀ erent interests. Obviously, the minority communities consist of diﬀ erent 
social layers and categories. This point is frequently neglected by the author. 
A modest non-involvement in the Baltic independence struggle as well as state-building are factors 
that the author continously explains by pointing to the limited 
opportunities available to non-titular groups to participate in political decison-making. As the 
Baltic states are basically democracies, then what kind of legal contraints, as the author claims, are 
placed on the members of minority communities remains unclear (p.275). By taking into account the 
state, initially even restrictive citizenship policy, the point made by Agarin sounds pretty ‘narrow’, 
the Baltic revolutions and the ‘doors’ of state-buiding were opened (and still are) for all social layers 
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irrespective of which nationality they hold. On the other hand, legal state regulations and decisions 
are hardly capable of changing hidden perceptions, feelings of historical grievances, stereotypes of 
titular nations and ethnic minorities.
I disagree with the author’s claim that only a small part of the minority communities are 
represented among political and social elites (p.281). I agree with Agarin that among top political 
elites the representativity of ethnic minorities leaves a lot be desired, that the Russian speakers have 
not been represented in the Baltic parliaments and governments proportionally to their size, but on 
the other hand, the minority represesentativness is pretty high on the local level and in municipalities. 
Just to remind the author that in Riga and Tallinn city councils, the conﬁ guration of non-core ethnics 
comprises close to ﬁ fty percent. 
Agarin admits the standpoint common to many political theorists, which could be summarized 
as the stronger the civil society, the better oﬀ  the quality of democracy is. Indeed, Agarin is right 
in claiming that public engagement in political decision-making represents an essential mechanism 
for continous democratisation (p.21-28). That is why the author’s special attention to civil society in 
the Baltics is justiﬁ ed. Minority-led initiatives and proposals are not taken into account in decision-
making (p.319), etc. However, the problems of civil society, for instance, in Estonia and elsewhere in 
the Baltics are much deeper than the author sees. While Agarin is talking about non-inclusiveness 
and the lack of policy response to the issues of relevance for minority groups in the region, he is 
neglecting the notion that unresponsiveness of civil society groups does exist among core-nationals 
as well (p.305, 319). 
How could the author blame the majorities for the lack of political will to accommodate the 
claims advanced in the civic networks of the minority members of Baltic societies, when in reality 
minority groups express their interests relatively rarely and not actively (p.311).
Agarin is certainly right when he stresses the impact of the historical legacies on current inter-
ethnic relations between majorities and minorities. However, in elaborating these points his analysis 
seems to be shallow. The author explains the Baltic states’ non-violent regime change and a relatively 
peaceful interethnic development (the tensions never mounted to violent conﬂ icts in the Baltic 
societies (p.324) between two communities by citing the presence of a tacit agreement of ethnic 
minorities, a mindset inherited from Soviet times. Agarin is trying to draw direct parallels between the 
actions of the core national elite and minorities with the Soviet legacies in the past (p.326). In doing 
so, the author is forgetting that the political elite’s conﬁ guration has been substantially altered during 
the last two decades. At the beginning of transition, indeed, the communist continuity was great 
among the political elite, especially in the 1990s; however, the last decade has witnessed fundamental 
changes in the political elite conﬁ gurations in all three states. 
Blaming new majorities is always the easy way to gain distance from the essence of the problems. 
More importantly, the author should have analysed more in depth how the former ruling majority 
all of a sudden became a minority. It would be naive to think that the concept of the ‘elder brother 
of all the Soviet nations’ heavily propagated in Stalinist and Brezhnevite times has lost its impact 
among Russians after the regime change. Psychologically it must have been pretty hard (adaptation) 
and unacceptable for many Russians. Furthemore, even today the interethnic relations ‘suﬀ er’ 
from this kind of pro-Soviet mindset. In other words, twenty years after the regime change many 
Russian speakers are not used to holding a minority status, in particular the elderly people. One 
should not ‘blame’ as the author does only the national political elite for being largely ‘guilty’ of the 
marginalisation of minorities. The weakness of the ethnicities in the Baltics is clearly associated with 
the lack of unity, the absence of recognised non-titular political leaders, who would potentially lead 
diverse minority groups to stand actively for their rights. Generally speaking, the Russian-speaking 
political elite in the Baltics is still just beginning to develop and is quite ﬂ imsy. The author should have 
contemplated these points as well.
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I also disagree with the following statements: “Russian speakers lost interest in the fate of Soviet 
state that visibly contributed in its desintegration” (p.38 ); “Many of the non-titular immigrants in 
the Baltics were alienated from general line of the CPSU?” (p.54); “the Russian-speaking minority was 
systematically discouraged to participate in political decision-making“ (p.59).
However, the fact is that no inﬂ uencial and organised dissents of non-titulars existed in Soviet 
times in the Baltics. Half of the Communist party members came from non-titular nationalities, 
although the number diﬀ ers across the three states. They were people who worked mostly in all-union 
factories and belonged to the proletariat. The latter social category, due to the quota system, had an 
advantage of being accepted into the ranks of the Communist party. This particular layer was the main 
instrument in implementing the Communist party line in the Baltics. The majority of the key social 
positions both in the Communist party hierarchy and Soviet state structures were occupied by either 
ethnic Balts, who had been raised and Russiﬁ ed in remote areas of the Soviet Union (some of them 
hardly spoke any of the local language) or by non-titulars who were directly sent to the republics by 
Moscow. The deputy secretary of the Republican Communist Party was a position speciﬁ cally created 
in order to secure and balance the Communist party line in places, etc. Therefore, I disagree when 
the author writes that “A signiﬁ cant part of the Russian-speaking residents of the Baltic Republics 
had actively supported the separation of their republics from the USSR in the second half of the 
1980s“ (p.70). The argument that only 20-30 percent of non-titulars were engaged directly in the anti-
independence Interfront movement does not necessarily mean that the rest of the non-indigenous 
population actively supported Baltic independence. Admittedly, some of the minority representatives 
were actively engaged in the struggle for Baltic independence, however, it was rather a ‘wait and see’ 
mentality that prevailed. During that time, many popular forces (incl. core-nationals) did not dare to 
voice their genuine aims to separate from the USSR due to the uncertainty of the political situation.  
One may assume that in ethnically split societies like Latvia and Estonia, where state and nation-
building processes were closely related to achieving indigenous control over political institutions, 
the questions of interethnic relations would be much diﬀ erent from more ethnically homogenous 
societies like Lithuania. Indeed, the author is right in stating that “ethnic issues to be taken seriously” 
are largely absent in Lithuania. According to this logic, one may expect the national consensus policy, 
the ethnic representation, the level of civil society, and hence the quality of democracy to be at a 
much higher level in Lithuania compared to Estonia and Latvia. However, this is largely not the case. 
Chapter seven addresses the question of how structural constraints imposed by the language 
legislation conditions diﬀ er according to the opinions of diﬀ erent ethnic communities. The proﬁ ciency 
in the state language is taken as an indicator for persisting social inequalities across the region? Even 
if we assume that minorities are speaking the state language ﬂ uently, I agree, it clearly contributes 
towards integration. However, it is not only the language ability that matters. Obviuosly, any advanced 
state in the world requires the knowledge of their oﬃ  cial language as the prerequisite to applying 
for citizenship, and it is taken as an advantage in proceeding up the career ladder. The good language 
ability of an individual is not a criterion for being loyal to the state, just the same as poor language 
skills are not necessarily the criterion for individuals’ alienatation, as the author claims. The latter is 
a much more complex phenomenon.
If the book explores the role played by the Russian speakers throughout recent history, then 
analysing one or another social process, parallels, and hints to titular nations are inevitable. However, 
these kind of comparisions are hardly attainable throughout the book.
The book is written from the angle of minority concerns and problems. It makes little or no eﬀ ort 
to understand, analyse (not to say justify) the political behavior of the core majority political elites. 
Everything the political national elites are doing is almost completely negative and worthy of criticism. 
Such kind of ‘denial’ is derived from the non-inclusion of minorities in the political processes and 
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the reluctancy to accept minority opinions and expressions by the elites. However, black and white 
discourse schemes (by the way, so common to Stalinist and Soviet times) are not the best guides to 
leading the reader towards objectivity.
Generally speaking, it seems that the author is trying in any case (or at all costs) to raise the role 
and place the non-titulars played in regaining Baltic independence and further on in state-building. 
However, one should not forget that in a multiethnic Europe the problems of minorities are acute 
everywhere, and the Baltic states are no exception in this respect. In other words, the marginalisation 
of ethnic minorites is not just a ‘fashionable’ concept peculiar to the Baltic states, but common to 
many states all over the world. Whether Western states are paying much more attention to overcoming 
alienation and marginalisation of this kind, remains to be seen.
As a matter of fact, as many of us know, a cat usually licks several times, not just once and for all.
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